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Abstract—Universal security over a network with linear
network coding has been intensively studied. However, previous
linear codes used for this purpose were linear over a larger
field than that used on the network. In this work, we introduce
new parameters (relative dimension/rank support profile and
relative generalized matrix weights) for linear codes that are
linear over the field used in the network, measuring the
universal security performance of these codes. The proposed
new parameters enable us to use optimally universal secure
linear codes on noiseless networks for all possible parameters, as
opposed to previous works, and also enable us to add universal
security to the recently proposed list-decodable rank-metric
codes by Guruswami et al. We give several properties of the
new parameters: monotonicity, Singleton-type lower and upper
bounds, a duality theorem, and definitions and characterizations
of equivalences of linear codes. Finally, we show that our
parameters strictly extend relative dimension/length profile
and relative generalized Hamming weights, respectively, and
relative dimension/intersection profile and relative generalized
rank weights, respectively. Moreover, we show that generalized
matrix weights are larger than Delsarte generalized weights.
I. INTRODUCTION
Linear network coding was first studied in [1], [2] and
[16], and allows to realize higher throughput than the con-
ventional storing and forwarding. In this context, security
over the network, meaning information leakage to a wire-
tapping adversary, was first considered in [3] and later in [6].
However, both approaches require knowing and/or modifying
the underlying linear network code, which does not allow to
perform, for instance, random linear network coding [12].
The use of outer coding on the source node was proposed
in [7] to protect messages from information leakage knowing
but without modifying the underlying linear network code.
Later, the use of linear (block) codes as outer codes was pro-
posed in [25] to protect messages from errors together with
information leakage to a wire-tapping adversary, depending
only on the number of errors and wire-tapped links, and not
depending on the underlying linear network code, which was
there referred to as “universal security”. In particular, optimal
parameters are obtained in [25] for universal security over
noiseless networks for some restricted packet lengths.
This approach was further investigated in [15], where
relative generalized rank weights (RGRWs) and relative
dimension/intersection profiles (RDIPs) were introduced to
measure simultaneously the universal security performance
and correction capability of pairs of linear codes, which are
used for coset coding as in [28].
Unfortunately, the codes proposed in [25] and [15] are
linear over the finite field Fqm , where m is the packet length,
if the linear network coding is performed over the finite
field Fq . This restricts the achievable parameters, requires
performing computations over the larger field Fqm and leaves
out important codes, such as the codes obtained in [11],
which are the first list-decodable rank-metric codes whose
list sizes are polynomial in the code length. Moreover, even
though there exist maximum rank distance codes (see [5]),
and hence optimally universal secure codes for noiseless
networks, that can be applied for all number of outgoing
links from the source, all packet lengths and all dimensions
over Fq , the maximum rank distance codes considered in
[25] and [15] only include Gabidulin codes [9] and some
reducible codes [10], for which the previous parameters are
restricted.
In this work, we study the universal security performance
of codes and coset coding schemes that are linear over the
smaller field Fq. After some preliminaries in Section II, the
new contributions of this paper are organized as follows:
In Section III, we introduce relative dimension/rank sup-
port profiles (RDRPs) and relative generalized matrix weights
(RGMWs) and give their monotonicity properties. In Section
IV, we prove that RDRPs and RGMWs exactly measure
the worst case information leakage on networks, and then
we give optimal linear coset coding schemes for noiseless
networks for all possible parameters, in contrast to previous
works. In Section V, we show how to add universal security
to the list-decodable codes in [11] using linear coset coding
schemes and the study in the previous sections. In Section
VI, we study basic properties of RDRPs and RGMWs: Upper
and lower Singleton-type bounds and the duality theorem
for GMWs. In Section VII, we define and study security
equivalences of linear codes, and then obtain ranges of
possible parameters and minimum parameters of linear codes
up to these equivalences. Finally, in Section VIII, we prove
that RDRPs strictly extend RDLPs [8], [17] and RDIPs [15],
and we prove that RGMWs strictly extend RGHWs [17],
[27] and RGRWs [15]. We conclude by showing that GMWs
are larger (strictly in some cases) than Delsarte generalized
weights [23].
Due to space limitations, some proofs are omitted. They
can be found in the extended version [19].
II. COSET CODING SCHEMES FOR UNIVERSAL SECURITY
IN LINEAR NETWORK CODING
A. Notation
Let q be a prime power and m and n, two positive integers.
We denote by F an arbitrary field and by Fq the finite field
with q elements. Fn denotes the vector space of row vectors
of length n with components in F, and Fm×n denotes the
vector space of m × n matrices with components in F. For
a vector space V over F and a subset A ⊆ V , we denote
by 〈A〉 the vector space generated by A over F, and we
denote by dim(V) the dimension of V over F. Finally, AT ∈
Fn×m denotes the transposed of a matrix A ∈ Fm×n, Rk(A)
denotes its rank, and the symbols + and ⊕ denote the sum
and direct sum of vector spaces, respectively.
Throughout the paper, a (block) code in Fm×n (respec-
tively, in Fn) is a subset of Fm×n (respectively, of Fn), and
it is called linear if it is a vector space.
B. Linear network coding model
Consider a network with several sources and several sinks.
A given source transmits a message x ∈ Fℓq through the
network to multiple sinks. To that end, that source encodes
the message as a collection of n packets of length m, seen as
a matrix C ∈ Fm×nq , where n is the number of outgoing links
from this source. We consider linear network coding on the
network, first considered in [1], [16] and formally defined in
[14, Definition 1], which allows to reach higher throughput
than just storing and forwarding on the network. This means
that a given sink receives a matrix of the form
Y = CAT ∈ Fm×Nq ,
where A ∈ FN×nq is called the transfer matrix corresponding
to the considered source and sink. This matrix may be
randomly chosen if random linear network coding is applied
[12].
C. Universal secure communication over networks
In secure or reliable network coding, two of the main
problems addressed in the literature are the following:
1) Error and erasure correction [15], [24], [25]: An adver-
sary and/or a noisy channel may introduce errors on
some links of the network and/or modify the transfer
matrix, hence the sink receives the matrix
Y = CA′T + E ∈ Fm×Nq ,
where A′ ∈ FN×nq is the modified transfer matrix, and
E ∈ Fm×Nq is the final error matrix. We say that t =
Rk(E) errors and ρ = n− Rk(A′) erasures occurred.
2) Information leakage [3], [6], [7], [15], [25]: A wire-
tapping adversary listens to µ > 0 links of the network,
obtaining a matrix of the form CBT ∈ Fm×µq , for some
matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq .
Outer coding in the source node is usually applied to tackle
the previous problems, and it is called “universal secure”
[25] if it provides security as in the previous items for fixed
numbers of wire-tapped links µ, errors t and erasures ρ,
independently of the transfer matrix A used. This implies
that no previous knowledge or modification of the transfer
matrix is required and random linear network coding [12]
may be applied.
D. Coset coding schemes for outer codes
The concept of coset coding scheme was introduced in [28]
to protect messages simultaneously from errors and informa-
tion leakage. We use the formal definition [15, Definition
7]:
Definition 1 (Coset coding schemes [15], [28]). A coset
coding scheme over the field F with message set S is a family
of disjoint nonempty subsets of Fm×n, PS = {Cx}x∈S .
Each x ∈ S is encoded by the source by choosing
uniformly at random an element C ∈ Cx.
In this paper, we will consider the particular case obtained
by using nested linear code pairs, introduced in [29, Section
III.A]:
Definition 2 (Nested linear code pairs [29]). A nested linear
code pair is a pair of linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n. Choose
a vector space W such that C1 = C2⊕W and a vector space
isomorphism ψ : Fℓ −→ W , where ℓ = dim(C1/C2). Then
we define the sets Cx = ψ(x) + C2, for x ∈ Fℓ.
These coset coding schemes are linear in the following
sense:
aCx + bCy ⊆ Cax+by,
for all a, b ∈ F and all x,y ∈ Fℓ. Moreover, they are the
only coset coding schemes with this linearity property (see
[18, Proposition 1]).
III. NEW PARAMETERS OF LINEAR COSET CODING
SCHEMES FOR UNIVERSAL SECURITY ON NETWORKS
Inspired by [13], [15], [18], we define rank supports and
rank support spaces as follows:
Definition 3 (Row space and rank). For a matrix C ∈
Fm×n, we define its row space Row(C) as the vector space
in Fn generated by its rows, and its rank as Rk(C) =
dim(Row(C)).
Definition 4 (Rank support and rank weight [13, Defini-
tion 1]). Given a vector space C ⊆ Fm×n, we define its rank
support as
RSupp(C) =
∑
C∈C
Row(C) ⊆ Fn.
We also define the rank weight of the space C as
wtR(C) = dim(RSupp(C)).
Obviously, RSupp(〈{C}〉) = Row(C) and wtR(〈{C}〉)
= Rk(C), for every matrix C ∈ Fm×n.
Definition 5 (Rank support spaces). Given a vector space
L ⊆ Fn, we define its rank support space VL ⊆ Fm×n as
VL = {V ∈ Fm×n | Row(V ) ⊆ L}.
We denote by RS(Fm×n) the family of rank support spaces
in Fm×n.
A proof of the following result can be found in [19]:
Theorem 1. Fix a set V ⊆ Fm×n. The following are
equivalent:
1) V is a rank support space. That is, there exists a
subspace L ⊆ Fn such that V = VL.
2) V is linear and has a basis of the form Bi,j , for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , k, where there are
vectors b1,b2, . . . ,bk ∈ Fn such that Bi,j has the
vector bj in the i-th row and the rest of its rows are
zero vectors.
3) There exists a matrix B ∈ Fµ×n, for some positive
integer µ, such that
V = {V ∈ Fm×n | V BT = 0}.
In addition, the relation between items 1, 2 and 3 is that
b1,b2, . . . ,bk are a basis of L, B is a (possibly not full-
rank) parity check matrix of L and dim(L) = n − Rk(B).
In particular,
dim(VL) = m dim(L). (1)
We conclude by studying the duality of rank support
spaces. We consider the following inner product in Fm×n:
Definition 6 (Hilbert-Schmidt or trace product). Given
matrices C,D ∈ Fm×n, we define its Hilbert-Schmidt
product, or trace product, as
〈C,D〉 = Trace(CDT )
=
m∑
i=1
ci · di =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ci,jdi,j ∈ F,
where ci and di are the rows of C and D, respectively, and
where ci,j and di,j are their components, respectively.
Given a vector space C ⊆ Fm×n, we denote by C⊥ its
dual:
C⊥ = {D ∈ Fm×n | 〈C,D〉 = 0, ∀C ∈ C}.
Since the trace product in Fm×n coincides with the usual
inner product in Fmn, it holds that
dim(C⊥) = mn− dim(C), C ⊆ D ⇐⇒ D⊥ ⊆ C⊥,
C⊥⊥ = C, (C+D)⊥ = C⊥∩D⊥, (C ∩D)⊥ = C⊥+D⊥,
for linear codes C,D ⊆ Fm×n. We also have the following:
Proposition 1. If V ∈ RS(Fm×n), then V⊥ ∈ RS(Fm×n).
More concretely, for any subspace L ⊆ Fn, it holds that
(VL)
⊥ = V(L⊥).
With these tools, we may now define the new parameters:
Definition 7 (Relative Dimension/Rank support Profile).
Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n,
we define their µ-th relative dimension/rank support profile
(RDRP) as
KM,µ(C1, C2) = max{ dim(C1 ∩ VL)− dim(C2 ∩ VL) |
L ⊆ Fn, dim(L) ≤ µ}.
Definition 8 (Relative Generalized Matrix Weight). Given
nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n, and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ =
dim(C1/C2), we define their r-th relative generalized matrix
weight (RGMW) as
dM,r(C1, C2) = min{ dim(L) | L ⊆ Fn,
dim(C1 ∩ VL)− dim(C2 ∩ VL) ≥ r}.
For a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n, and 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C), we
define its r-th generalized matrix weight (GMW) as
dM,r(C) = dM,r(C, {0}). (2)
We next obtain the following characterization of RGMWs
that gives an analogous description to the original definition
of generalized Hamming weights by Wei [27]:
Theorem 2. Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n,
and an integer 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C1/C2), it holds that
dM,r(C1, C2) = min{wtR(D) | D ⊆ C1,D ∩ C2 = {0},
dim(D) = r}.
In particular, it holds that
dM,1(C1, C2) = dR(C1, C2) = min{Rk(C) | C ∈ C1, C /∈ C2}.
Proof: Denote by dr and d′r the left-hand and right-hand
sides of the first equality, respectively.
First, take a vector space D ⊆ C1 such that D∩C2 = {0},
dim(D) = r and wtR(D) = d′r. Define L = RSupp(D).
Since D ⊆ VL, we have that dim((C1∩VL)/(C2∩VL)) ≥
dim((C1 ∩ D)/(C2 ∩ D)) = dim(D) = r. Hence
dr ≤ dim(L) = wtR(D) = d
′
r.
Conversely, take a vector space L ⊆ Fn, such that
dim((C1 ∩ VL)/(C2 ∩ VL)) ≥ r and dim(L) = dr.
There exists a vector space D ⊆ C1 ∩ VL with D ∩ C2 =
{0} and dim(D) = r. We have that RSupp(D) ⊆ L, since
D ⊆ VL, and hence
dr = dim(L) ≥ wtR(D) ≥ d
′
r.
Finally, we show the monotonicity properties of RDRPs
and RGMWs (see [19] for a proof):
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity of RDRPs). Given nested
linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n − 1, it
holds that KM,0(C1, C2) = 0, KM,n(C1, C2) = dim(C1/C2)
and
0 ≤ KM,µ+1(C1, C2)−KM,µ(C1, C2) ≤ m.
Proposition 3 (Monotonicity of RGMWs). Given nested
linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n with ℓ = dim(C1/C2), it
holds that
0 ≤ dM,r+1(C1, C2)− dM,r(C1, C2) ≤ min{m,n},
for 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ− 1, and
dM,r(C1, C2) + 1 ≤ dM,r+m(C1, C2),
for 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ−m.
IV. UNIVERSAL SECURITY PERFORMANCE OF LINEAR
COSET CODING SCHEMES
A. Measuring information leakage on networks
In this subsection, we consider the problem of information
leakage on the network, see Subsection II-C, item 2.
Assume that a given source wants to convey the message
x ∈ Fℓq, which we assume is a random variable with uniform
distribution over Fℓq . Following Subsection II-D, the source
encodes x into a matrix C ∈ Fm×nq using nested linear codes
C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq . We also assume that the distributions used
in the encoding are all uniform (see Subsection II-D).
According to the information leakage model in Subsection
II-C, item 2, a wire-tapping adversary obtains CBT ∈ Fm×µq ,
for some matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq .
In the following proposition, I(X ;Y ) stands for the mu-
tual information of two random variables X and Y (see [4]).
Proposition 4. Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq ,
a matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq , and the uniform random variables x
and CBT , as in the previous paragraphs, it holds that
I(x;CBT ) = dim(C⊥2 ∩ VL)− dim(C
⊥
1 ∩ VL), (3)
where L = Row(B).
Proof: Define the linear map f : Fm×nq −→ Fm×µq by
f(D) = DBT , D ∈ Fm×nq . It holds that
H(CBT ) = H(f(C)) = logq(#f(C1)) = dim(f(C1))
= dim(C1)− dim(ker(f) ∩ C1).
Similarly, for the conditional entropy:
H(CBT | x) = dim(C2)− dim(ker(f) ∩ C2).
It holds that ker(f) = VL⊥ ⊆ Fm×n by Theorem 1. Thus,
using I(x;CBT ) = H(CBT ) − H(CBT | x), ker(f) =
VL⊥ and a dimensions computation, (3) follows.
The following theorem follows from the previous propo-
sition, the definitions and Theorem 2:
Theorem 3 (Worst case information leakage). Given
nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq , and integers
0 ≤ µ ≤ n and 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C1/C2), it holds that
1) r = KM,µ(C⊥2 , C⊥1 ) is the maximum information
(number of bits multiplied by log2(q)) about the sent
message that can be obtained by wire-tapping at most
µ links of the network.
2) µ = dM,r(C⊥2 , C⊥1 ) is the minimum number of links that
an adversary needs to wire-tap in order to obtain at
least r units of information (number of bits multiplied
by log2(q)) of the sent message.
In particular, t = dR(C⊥2 , C⊥1 )−1 is the maximum number of
links that an adversary may listen to without obtaining any
information about the sent message.
B. Optimal linear coset coding schemes for noiseless net-
works
In this subsection, we obtain linear coset coding schemes
built from nested linear code pairs C $ Fm×n with optimal
universal security parameters in the case of finite fields F =
Fq . Recall from Subsection II-D that these linear coset coding
schemes are suitable for noiseless networks, as noticed in
[21].
Definition 9. For a nested linear code pair of the form
C $ Fm×nq , we define its information parameter as ℓ =
dim(Fm×nq /C) = dim(C
⊥), that is the maximum number of
log2(q) bits of information that the source can convey, and
its security parameter t as the maximum number of links that
an adversary may listen to without obtaining any information
about the sent message.
We study two problems:
1) Find a nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq with
maximum possible security parameter t when m, n,
q and the information parameter ℓ are fixed and given.
2) Find a nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq with
maximum possible information parameter ℓ when m,
n, q and the security parameter t are fixed and given.
Thanks to Theorem 3, which implies that t = dR(C⊥)−1,
and the Singleton bound on the minimum rank distance [5,
Theorem 5.4], we may give upper bounds on the attainable
parameters in the previous two problems:
Proposition 5. Given a nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq
with information parameter ℓ and security parameter t, it
holds that:
ℓ ≤ max{m,n}(min{m,n} − t), (4)
t ≤ min{m,n} −
⌈
ℓ
max{m,n}
⌉
. (5)
In particular, ℓ ≤ mn and t ≤ min{m,n}.
On the other hand, the existence of linear codes in Fm×nq
attaining the Singleton bound on their dimensions, for all
possible choices of m, n and minimum rank distance dR
[5, Theorem 6.3], leads to the following existence result on
optimal linear coset coding schemes for noiseless networks.
Theorem 4. For all choices of positive integers m and n,
and all finite fields Fq, the following hold:
1) For every positive integer ℓ ≤ mn, there exists a
nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq with information
parameter ℓ and security parameter t = min{m,n}−
⌈(ℓ/max{m,n})⌉.
2) For every positive integer t ≤ min{m,n}, there
exists a nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq with
security parameter t and information parameter ℓ =
max{m,n}(min{m,n} − t).
Remark 1. We remark here that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, only the linear coset coding schemes in item 2 in the
previous theorem, for the special case n ≤ m, have been
obtained in the literature. It corresponds to [25, Theorem 7].
Using cartesian products of MRD codes as in [25, Sub-
section VII-C], linear coset coding schemes as in item 2 in
the previous theorem can be obtained when n > m, for the
restricted parameters n = lm and ℓ = mlk′, where l and
k′ < m are positive integers.
Therefore, the previous theorem completes the search for
linear coset coding schemes with optimal security parameters
for noiseless networks.
V. UNIVERSAL SECURE LIST-DECODABLE RANK-METRIC
LINEAR COSET CODING SCHEMES
In this section, we will show how to build a nested linear
code pair C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq that can be used to list-decode
rank errors, which naturally appear on the network, whose
list sizes are polynomial on the code length n, while being
univeral secure under a given number of wire-tapped links.
We will also compare the obtained parameters with those
obtained when choosing C1 and C2 as Gabidulin maximum
rank distance (MRD) codes [9].
A. Linear coset coding schemes using Gabidulin MRD codes
Assume that n ≤ m and C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq are MRD
linear codes (such as Gabidulin codes [9]) of dimensions
dim(C1) = mk1 and dim(C2) = mk2.
The linear coset coding scheme constructed from this
nested linear code pair satisfies the following properties:
1) The information parameter is ℓ = m(k1 − k2).
2) The security parameter is t = k2.
3) If the number of rank errors is e ≤ ⌊n−k12 ⌋, then
rank error-correction can be performed, giving a unique
solution.
B. List-decodable linear coset coding schemes for the rank
metric
Assume now that n divides m. For the same positive
integers 1 ≤ k2 < k1 ≤ n as in the previous subsection,
and for fixed ε > 0 and positive integer s, we may construct
a linear coset coding scheme from a nested linear code pair
C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq , with the following properties:
1) The information parameter is ℓ ≥ m(k1− k2)(1− 2ε).
2) The security parameter is t ≥ k2.
3) If the number of rank errors is e ≤ ss+1 (n− k1), then
rank-metric list-decoding allows to obtain in polyno-
mial time a list (of uncoded secret messages) of size
qO(s
2/ε2)
, which is polynomial in the code length n.
Therefore, we may obtain the same security performance
as in the previous subsection, an information parameter that
is at least 1−2ε times the one in the previous subsection, and
can list-decode in polynomial time (with list of polynomial
size) roughly n−k1 errors, which is twice as many as in the
previous subsection.
Now we show the construction. Fix a basis α1, α2, . . . , αm
of Fqm as a vector space over Fq, such that α1, α2, . . . , αn
generate Fqn . We define the matrix representation map Mα :
Fnqm −→ F
m×n
q associated to the previous basis by
Mα(c) = (ci,j)1≤i≤m,1≤j≤n, (6)
where ci = (ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,n) ∈ Fnq , for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
are the unique vectors in Fnq such that c =
∑m
i=1 αici. The
map Mα : Fnqm −→ Fm×nq is an Fq-linear vector space
isomorphism.
Recall that a q-linearized polynomial over Fqm is a polyno-
mial of the form F (x) =
∑d
i=0 Fix
qi
, where Fi ∈ Fqm . De-
note also evα(F (x)) = (F (α1), F (α2), . . . , F (αn)) ∈ Fnqm ,
and finally define
C2 = {Mα(evα(F (x))) | Fi = 0 for i < k1−k2 and i ≥ k1},
C1 = {Mα(evα(F (x))) | Fi ∈ Hi for 0 ≤ i < k1 − k2,
Fi ∈ Fqm for k1 − k2 ≤ i < k1, Fi = 0 for i ≥ k1},
whereH0,H1, . . . ,Hk1−k2−1 ⊆ Fqm are the Fq-linear vector
spaces described in [11, Theorem 8].
A secret message is a vector x ∈ H0 × H1 × · · · ×
Hk1−k2−1, and the encoding is as follows: choose uniformly
at random a q-linearized polynomial F (x) =
∑k1−1
i=0 Fix
qi
over Fqm such that x = (F0, F1, . . . , Fk1−k2−1).
Now we prove the previous three items:
1) The information parameter ℓ coincides with the dimen-
sion of the linear code
W = {Mα(evα(F (x))) | Fi ∈ Hi for i < k1 − k2
and Fi = 0 for i ≥ k1 − k2},
which is at least m(k1 − k2)(1− 2ε) by [11, Theorem
8], as explained in [11, page 2713].
2) By Theorem 3, the security parameter is t =
dR(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 )−1 ≥ dR(C
⊥
2 )−1. Since C2 is MRD, then
so is its trace dual [5], which means that dR(C⊥2 ) =
k2 + 1, and the result follows.
3) We first perform list-decoding using the code C1,
and obtain in polynomial time a list that is an (s −
1,m/n, k1)-periodic subspace of Fk1qm by [11, Lemma
16] (recall the definition of periodic subspace from [11,
Definition 9]).
Project this periodic subspace onto the first k1 − k2
coordinates, which still gives a periodic subspace, and
intersect it with H0 × H1 × · · · × Hk1−k2−1. Such
intersection is an Fq-linear affine space of dimension
at most O(s2/ε2), as in the proof of [11, Theorem 17],
and hence the result follows.
VI. BASIC PROPERTIES OF RGMWS
We give now upper and lower Singleton-type bounds on
RGMWs of nested linear code pairs:
Theorem 5 (Upper Singleton bound). Given nested linear
codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2), it
holds that
dM,r(C1, C2) ≤ n−
⌈
ℓ− r + 1
m
⌉
+ 1. (7)
In particular, it follows that
dim(C1/C2) ≤ max{m,n}(min{m,n} − dR(C1, C2) + 1).
Proof: First, we have that dM,ℓ(C1, C2) ≤ n by def-
inition. For the general case, it is enough to prove that
mdM,r(C1, C2) ≤ mn − ℓ + r + m − 1. Assume that
1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ − hm, where the integer h ≥ 0 is the maximum
possible. That is, r+(h+1)m > ℓ. Using Proposition 3, we
obtain
mdM,r(C1, C2) ≤ mdM,r+hm(C1, C2)− hm
≤ mdM,ℓ(C1, C2)− hm ≤ mn− ℓ+ r +m− 1,
where the last inequality follows from mdM,ℓ(C1, C2) ≤ mn
and r + (h+ 1)m− 1 ≥ ℓ.
Theorem 6 (Lower Singleton bound). Given nested linear
codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C1/C2), it holds
that mdM,r(C1, C2) ≥ r, which implies that
dM,r(C1, C2) ≥
⌈ r
m
⌉
. (8)
Proof: Take a subspace D ⊆ Fm×n and define L =
RSupp(D). Using (1), we see that
mwtR(D) = m dim(L) = dim(VL) ≥ dim(D).
The result follows from this and Theorem 2.
On the other hand, it is well-known that, in the Hamming
case, all generalized Hamming weights of a linear code
determine uniquely those of the corresponding dual code.
This is known as Wei’s Duality Theorem [27, Theorem 3].
Next we give an analogous result for the generalized matrix
weights of a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n and its dual C⊥. See
[19] for a proof.
Theorem 7 (Duality theorem). Given a linear code C ⊆
Fm×n with k = dim(C), and given an integer p ∈ Z, define
Wp(C) ={dM,p+rm(C) | r ∈ Z, 1 ≤ p+ rm ≤ k},
W p(C) ={n+ 1− dM,p+rm(C) | r ∈ Z, 1 ≤ p+ rm ≤ k}.
Then it holds that
{1, 2, . . . , n} =Wp(C
⊥) ∪W p+k(C),
where the union is disjoint.
VII. SECURITY EQUIVALENCES OF LINEAR COSET
CODING SCHEMES AND MINIMUM PARAMETERS
In this section, we study when two nested linear code pairs
C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and C′2 $ C′1 ⊆ Fm
′×n′ have the same
security and reliability performance, meaning they perform
equally regarding information leakage and error correction.
In this sense, we conclude the section by studying the
minimum possible parameters m and n for a linear code,
which correspond to the packet length and the number of
outgoing links from the source node (see Subsection II-B).
A vector space isomorphism preserves full-secrecy thresh-
olds if it is a rank isometry, due to Theorem 3. On the
other hand, it completely preserves the security behaviour
of linear coset coding schemes if it preserves rank support
spaces, in view of Proposition 4. This motivates the following
definitions:
Definition 10 (Rank isometries and security equivalences).
We say that a vector space isomorphism φ : V −→ W
between rank support spaces V ∈ RS(Fm×n) and W ∈
RS(Fm×n
′
) is a rank isometry if Rk(φ(V )) = Rk(V ), for
all V ∈ V , and we say that it is a security equivalence if
U ⊆ V is a rank support space if, and only if, φ(U) ⊆ W is
a rank support space.
Two nested linear code pairs C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and C′2 $
C′1 ⊆ F
m×n′ are said to be security equivalent if there exist
rank support spaces V ∈ RS(Fm×n) and W ∈ RS(Fm×n′),
containing C1 and C′1, respectively, and a security equivalence
φ : V −→ W with φ(C1) = C′1 and φ(C2) = C′2.
The following result is inspired by [18, Theorem 5], which
treats a particular case. See [19] for a proof.
Theorem 8. Let φ : V −→ W be a vector space isomorphism
between rank support spaces V ∈ RS(Fm×n) and W ∈
RS(Fm×n
′
), and consider the following properties:
(P 1) There exist full-rank matrices A ∈ Fm×m and B ∈
Fn×n
′
such that φ(C) = ACB, for all C ∈ V .
(P 2) φ is a security equivalence.
(P 3) For all subspaces D ⊆ V , it holds that wtR(φ(D)) =
wtR(D).
(P 4) φ is a rank isometry.
Then the following implications hold:
(P 1)⇐⇒ (P 2)⇐⇒ (P 3) =⇒ (P 4).
In particular, a security equivalence is a rank isometry and,
in the case V =W = Fm×n and m 6= n, the converse holds.
Remark 2. Unfortunately, the implication (P 3) ⇐= (P 4)
not always holds. Take for instance m = n and the map φ :
Fm×m −→ Fm×m given by φ(C) = CT , for all C ∈ Fm×m.
The following consequence shows the minimum parame-
ters of a linear code and can be seen as an extension of [18,
Proposition 3].
Proposition 6. For a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n of dimension
k, the following hold:
1) There exists a linear code C′ ⊆ Fm×n′ that is security
equivalent to C if, and only if, n′ ≥ dM,k(C).
2) If m′ ≥ dM,k(CT ), then there exists a linear code C′ ⊆
Fm
′×n that is rank isometric to C, where
CT = {CT | C ∈ C} ⊆ Fn×m.
VIII. RELATION WITH OTHER EXISTING NOTIONS OF
GENERALIZED WEIGHTS
In this section, we study the relation between RGMWs
and other notions of generalized weights. In particular, we
consider the classical generalized Hamming weights [27],
relative generalized Hamming weights [17], relative general-
ized rank weights [15], [20] and Delsarte generalized weights
[23].
We also compare RDRPs with the relative dimen-
sion/length profile from [8], [17] and the relative dimen-
sion/intersection profile from [15].
A. RGMWs extend relative generalized rank weights
In this subsection, we prove that RGMWs extend the
relative generalized rank weights defined in [15].
Throughout the subsection, we will consider the extension
field Fqm of the finite field Fq , and vector spaces in Fnqm will
be considered to be linear over Fqm . We need first the notion
of Galois closed spaces [26]:
Definition 11 (Galois closed spaces [26]). We say that an
Fqm-linear vector space V ⊆ Fnqm is Galois closed if
Vq = {(vq1, v
q
2 , . . . , v
q
n) | (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ V} ⊆ V .
We denote by Υ(Fnqm) the family of Fqm-linear Galois closed
vector spaces in Fnqm .
Definition 12 (Relative Dimension/Intersection Profile [15,
Definition 1]). Given nested Fqm-linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆
Fnqm , and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we define their µ-th relative
dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) as
KR,µ(C1, C2) = max{ dim(C1 ∩ V)− dim(C2 ∩ V) |
V ∈ Υ(Fnqm), dim(V) ≤ µ},
where dimensions are taken over Fqm .
Definition 13 (Relative Generalized Rank Weigths [15,
Definition 2]). Given nested Fqm-linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆
Fnqm , and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2) (over Fqm), we define
their r-th relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) as
dR,r(C1, C2) = min{dim(V) | V ∈ Υ(Fnqm),
dim(C1 ∩ V)− dim(C2 ∩ V) ≥ r},
where dimensions are taken over Fqm .
We may now show the following characterization. Recall
the matrix representation map from (6).
Theorem 9. Let α1, α2, . . . , αm be a basis of Fqm as a
vector space over Fq, and let V ⊆ Fnqm be an arbitrary
set. The following are equivalent:
1) V ⊆ Fnqm is an Fqm -linear Galois closed vector space.
2) Mα(V) ⊆ Fm×nq is a rank support space.
Moreover, if Mα(V) = VL for a subspace L ⊆ Fn, then
dim(V) = dim(L),
where dim(V) is taken over Fqm .
Proof: For an arbitrary set V ⊆ Fnqm , [26, Lemma 1]
states that V is an Fqm -linear Galois closed vector space
if, and only if, V is Fq-linear and it has a basis over
Fq of the form vi,j = αibj , for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and
j = 1, 2, . . . , k, where b1,b2, . . . ,bk ∈ Fnq . By considering
Bi,j = Mα(vi,j) ∈ Fm×nq , we see that this condition is
equivalent to item 2 in Theorem 1, and we are done.
Therefore, the following result follows:
Corollary 1. Let α1, α2, . . . , αm be a basis of Fqm as a
vector space over Fq . Given nested Fqm-linear codes C2 $
C1 ⊆ Fnqm , and integers 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2) (over
Fqm ), 0 ≤ p ≤ m− 1 and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we have that
dR,r(C1, C2) = dM,rm−p(Mα(C1),Mα(C2)),
mKR,µ(C1, C2) = KM,µ(Mα(C1),Mα(C2)).
B. RGMWs extend relative generalized Hamming weights
In this subsection, we show that relative generalized matrix
weights also extend relative generalized Hamming weights
[17], and therefore generalized matrix weights extend gener-
alized Hamming weights [27]. We start with the definitions
of Hamming supports and Hamming support spaces:
Definition 14 (Hamming supports). Given a vector space
C ⊆ Fn, we define its Hamming support as
HSupp(C) = {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} |
∃(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C, ci 6= 0}.
We also define the Hamming weight of the space C as
wtH(C) = #HSupp(C).
Definition 15 (Hamming support spaces). Given a subset
I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we define its Hamming support space as
the vector space in Fn given by
LI = {(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fn | ci = 0, ∀i /∈ I}.
We may now define relative generalized Hamming weights
and relative dimension/lenght profile:
Definition 16 (Relative Dimension/Length Profile [8],
[17]). Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fn, and
0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we define their µ-th relative dimension/length
profile (RDLP) as
KH,µ(C1, C2) = max{dim(C1 ∩ LI)− dim(C2 ∩ LI) |
I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n},#I ≤ µ}.
Definition 17 (Relative Generalized Hamming Weigths
[17, Section III]). Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fn,
and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2), we define their r-th relative
generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) as
dH,r(C1, C2) = min{#I | I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}
dim(C1 ∩ LI)− dim(C2 ∩ LI) ≥ r}.
We will now show how to see vectors in Fn as matrices
in Fn×n. To that end, we introduce the diagonal matrix
representation map ∆ : Fn −→ Fn×n given by
∆(c) = diag(c) = (ciδi,j)1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n, (9)
where c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fn and δi,j represents the
Kronecker delta. In other words, ∆(c) is the diagonal matrix
whose diagonal vector is c.
Clearly ∆ is linear and one to one. Moreover, we have the
following properties.
Proposition 7. Let D ⊆ Fn be a vector space, and let
I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set. Defining J = HSupp(D) ⊆
{1, 2, . . . , n}, the following properties hold:
1) RSupp(∆(D)) = LJ ⊆ Fn.
2) For a rank support space V ⊆ Fn×n, if ∆(D) = V ∩
∆(Fn), then D = LJ .
3) wtR(∆(D)) = wtH(D).
Therefore, the following result holds:
Corollary 2. Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fn, and
integers 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2) and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we have
that
dH,r(C1, C2) = dM,r(∆(C1),∆(C2)),
KH,µ(C1, C2) = KM,µ(∆(C1),∆(C2)).
C. GMWs improve Delsarte generalized weights
A notion of generalized weights, called Delsarte gener-
alized weights, for a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n has already
been proposed in [23]. We will prove that generalized matrix
weights are larger than or equal to Delsarte generalized
weights for an arbitrary linear code, and we will prove that
the inequality is strict for some linear codes.
These weights are defined in terms of optimal anticodes
for the rank metric:
Definition 18 (Maximum rank distance). For a linear code
C ⊆ Fm×n, we define its maximum rank distance as
MaxRk(C) = max{Rk(C) | C ∈ C, C 6= 0}.
The following bound is given in [22, Proposition 47]:
dim(C) ≤ mMaxRk(C). (10)
This leads to the definition of rank-metric optimal anti-
codes:
Definition 19 (Optimal anticodes [23, Definition 22]). We
say that a linear code V ⊆ Fm×n is a (rank-metric) optimal
anticode if equality in (10) holds.
We will denote by A(Fm×n) the family of linear optimal
anticodes in Fm×n.
In view of this, Delsarte generalized weights are defined
in [23] as follows:
Definition 20 (Delsarte generalized weights [23, Defini-
tion 23]). For a linear code C ⊂ Fm×n and an integer
1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C), we define its r-th Delsarte generalized
weight (DGW) as
dD,r(C) = m
−1min{dim(V) | V ∈ A(Fm×n),
dim(C ∩ V) ≥ r}.
We have that rank support spaces are optimal anticodes,
which can be seen as [23, Theorem 18] due to Theorem 9.
Proposition 8 ([23, Theorem 18]). If a set V ⊆ Fm×n
is a rank support space, then it is a (rank-metric) optimal
anticode. In other words, RS(Fm×n) ⊆ A(Fm×n).
Thus, the next consequence follows from the previous
proposition and the corresponding definitions:
Corollary 3. For a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n and an integer
1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C), we have that
dD,r(C) ≤ dM,r(C).
However, RS(Fm×n) $ A(Fm×n) in general and, in
some cases, generalized matrix weights are strictly larger
than Delsarte generalized weights. Consider, for instance,
m = n = 2 and the linear code
C =
〈(
1 0
0 0
)
,
(
0 1
0 0
)〉
⊆ F2×2.
It holds that C is a linear optimal anticode, but it is not a rank
support space. Moreover, dD,2(C) = 1 and dM,2(C) = 2.
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